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Abstract
Recent research on trade and multinationals highlights a novel issue with
multinational firms. In particular, their integration strategies are complex
and the degree of vertical integration varies in a multilateral world with
many possible locations of activity. Multinationals may choose some plants
to serve consumers locally only, whereas others engage in trade. Overall,
this may explain the fact that a high percentage of world trade is actually
controlled by multinational firms, although most of the foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) occurs within the block of developed countries. The most
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important regional trade agreements (RTAs) are signed between members of
the very same block of economies. This gives rise to the question asked in
the present paper: what is the impact of RTAs on FDI in an interdependent
world? The paper focuses on the role of the Europe Agreements between
the member countries of the European Union and ten Central and Eastern
European countries. In doing so, recent spatial HAC estimation techniques
are applied to both estimation and testing.
Keywords: Regional trade agreements; Multinational firms; Spatial
econometrics; Generalized moments (GM) estimators
JEL: C33; F14; F15
1 Introduction
The second half of the last century was characterized by a surge of “bilat-
eralism” in trade policy. The foundation of the European Union (EU, for-
merly referred to as European Community), the European Free Trade Area
(EFTA), and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) are some of the
most sizeable regional trade agreements (RTAs) that were signed and imple-
mented within this period. As observed by authorities in empirical research
on trade issues, this process resulted in a significant increase in bilateral trade
volumes among the member countries (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, or
Glick and Rose, 2002). At the same time, foreign direct investment (FDI)
increased much faster than trade, even within the OECD and among the
members of the mentioned RTAs. While numerous studies on the impact of
2
RTAs on bilateral trade are now available, the question of how the bilateral-
ism of trade policy affects FDI seems under-researched.
The theory of horizontal multinational firms (Markusen, 1984) assumes
that the avoidance of trade impediments (including tariffs and other trade
costs) is a major reason for setting up foreign plants that produce the same
good in the parent and the host country. By way of contrast, vertical multina-
tional firms (Helpman, 1984) split up the production process across borders
to exploit gains from comparative advantage within the firm. For instance,
the gains from “outsourcing” production stages to low-wage countries and
the associated trade of intermediate goods within firms are important issues
with vertical multinational firms. Since these firms engage in trade, we expect
vertical FDI to increase through the implementation of RTAs. Hence, the
sign and magnitude of the coefficient of the RTA variable (typically a dummy
variable) in empirical FDI specifications is of interest for policy analysis. It
also implicitly indicates the relative importance of horizontal versus vertical
FDI.
However, more recent theory points to the complex integration strategies
of multinational firms (Yeaple, 2003, Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004,
Raff, 2004, and Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl, 2007). In particular, this
literature avoids the restrictive features of models with simple horizontal or
vertical multinationals. While it may be optimal to set up foreign subsidiaries
in some host countries to serve only the local consumers (the horizontal
motive), it may be optimal for the same firm to set up export platforms
in other host countries that serve consumers there and elsewhere. Hence,
this theory comes closer to the empirical stylized facts of mixed horizontal-
3
vertical and complex integration strategies within multinationals. Two issues
with complex multinational firms are of particular interest in the present
paper. First, it is an empirical reality that foreign subsidiaries are set up
in a multi-country world, and it is potentially insufficient to model bilateral
FDI as a function of bilateral determinants only. Firms set up their foreign
plants in accordance with the characteristics not only of a particular target
market but also with the characteristics of other potential host countries.
Second, the design of a multinational production and sales network likely
entails strategic aspects of plant location in space.1 Third, the role of RTAs
will be nontrivial with complex FDI. Low trade barriers are an incentive to
export not only for national but also for complex multinational firms (similar
to vertical multinationals). However, high trade barriers foster the location
of locally selling foreign subsidiaries (similar to horizontal multinationals).
Overall, the net effect of a reduction in trade barriers is less clear-cut in
complex than in simple forms of the multinational firm organization.
How does empirical work on the impact of RTAs relate to the theory of
multinational firms? As mentioned above, only a few articles address this
issue. Blomström and Kokko (1997) report on three case studies. They point
out that the implementation of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement led
to a reduction in intra-regional FDI to both the U.S. and Canada (i.e., a
negative impact on bilateral FDI), while it increased extra-regional FDI into
Canada (i.e., a positive third-country impact). Similarly, the establishment of
1Subsidiaries that produce intermediate goods for other downstream plants within the
firm will be located such that the overall delivery costs (covering not only production costs
but also trade costs) are minimized. Also, the location of foreign subsidiaries will not be
independent of the location decisions of competing multinationals.
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NAFTA has fostered extra-regional FDI into Mexico, as has Mercosur stimu-
lated extra-regional FDI into the member countries. Levi Yeyati, Stein, and
Daude (2002a,b) analyze the impact of RTAs on bilateral FDI stocks in a
large sample of countries. They point out that pooling the effect of integra-
tion agreements on FDI may be harmful, since this depends on the prevailing
mode of FDI (horizontal, local market seeking versus vertical, low-cost seek-
ing). By way of contrast, they mention that FDI into RTA member countries
is ceteris paribus more attractive than FDI to non-member countries. Their
findings indicate a significantly positive average impact of regional integra-
tion agreements on bilateral FDI. However, Levi Yeyati, Stein, and Daude
(2002a,b) do not consider interdependencies across host markets, which are
at the heart of this paper’s analysis.
Recent empirical research on the determinants of FDI support a signifi-
cant impact of interdependencies across markets. Coughlin and Segev (2000),
Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, Naughton (2005, 2007), and Baltagi, Egger, and
Pfaffermayr (2007), using different data, and spatial cross-sectional as well
as spatial panel data models, find that FDI between two countries is not
independent of FDI in other economies. This is expected from a general
equilibrium perspective (see Blonigen, 2005, for a survey). In a similar vein,
Drukker and Millimet (2007) provide evidence on spatial dependence in in-
ward FDI across US states.
This paper focuses on bilateral outward FDI stocks into Europe. The
sample covers 28 host countries over the period 1989-2001. We allow for
two types of spatial interaction. (i) Spatially weighted explanatory variables
that are motivated by a three-factor knowledge-capital model (reflecting,
5
e.g., third-country size and relative factor endowment effects on bilateral
FDI; see Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton, 2007). Also the Eu-
rope agreement dummy is spatially weighted to capture the third country
effects of trade liberalization on FDI. (ii) The disturbances are allowed to be
spatially correlated because of the regional interdependencies of stochastic
shocks between the host countries. Accordingly, we calculate spatial HAC
robust standard errors as proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (2007).
The estimation results illustrate that third-country effects are important
and lend support to a complex impact of the Europe Agreements on FDI.
The findings indicate that RTA membership of a European host country
leads to a relocation of FDI from other countries to RTA members. This
is consistent with models of export-platform FDI, where multinational firms
(re-)locate their subsidiaries in countries from which consumers in a larger
area can be served at lower trade costs (Raff, 2004; and Ekholm, Forslid,
Markusen, 2007).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
outlines the specification of bilateral FDI as supported by recent general
equilibrium theory. Section 3 provides details on the adopted econometric
approach. Section 4 reports the findings regarding the impact of the Europe
Agreements on bilateral FDI. Section 5 provides our policy recommenda-
tions, and the last section concludes with a summary of the most important
findings.
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2 Determinants of bilateral FDI and the role
of regional trade agreements
According to previous research, the most important empirical determinants
of multinational firm location are country size, skilled labor endowments,
trade and investment costs, and interaction terms thereof (Carr, Markusen,
and Maskus, 2001; Markusen and Maskus, 2002; and Blonigen, Davies, and
Head, 2003). While the actually estimated models are often in levels rather
than in logs, the latter approach is typically preferable from an economet-
ric point of view, as pointed out by Mutti and Grubert (2004). Taking
this into account, the log of FDI from country i to country j, yij, may
be formulated as a log-linear function of the following explanatory vari-
ables (see Markusen, 2002):2 the sum of home and host country GDP,
SGDPij = log(GDPi + GDPj), the relative size of the home and the host
market in terms of GDP, logGDPi − logGDPj,3 and the difference in ex-
porter and importer skill endowment ratios (approximated by gross sec-
ondary school enrolment in percent), DSKij = SKi − SKj. The latter
is also used in five interaction terms to account for the non-linear impact of
skilled labor endowment differences on FDI: INT1ij = DSKij×(logGDPi−
logGDPj) × I(DSKij ≤ 0), where I(DSKij ≤ 0) is an indicator variable
2In the application, we consider a panel data set with fixed country-pair and time
dummies. However, we skip the time index in the variable definition.
3We know from previous theoretical and empirical work that bilateral FDI stocks in-
crease in parent-to-host country relative GDP (or the corresponding log-difference; see
Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). Accordingly, we employ such a specification instead of the
squared difference in GDPs as used by others.
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that takes on the value 1 if the condition in parentheses holds and 0 other-
wise; INT2ij = DSKij× (logGDPi− logGDPj)× I(DSKij > 0); INT3ij =
DSKij×SGDPij×I(DSKij > 0); INT4ij = DSKij×SGDPij×I(DSKij ≤
0); and INT5ij = DSK2ij× logDISTij, where DISTij is the great circle dis-
tance between two countries’ capitals, serving as a proxy for trade costs.
Whereas horizontal FDI should rise if two markets grow larger and become
more similar (i.e., if SGDPij and RGDPij increase), vertical FDI should rise
if the parent country is small and well endowed with skilled labor, and trade
costs between the two markets are low. Accordingly, we expect a positive
sign for the coefficients of SGDPij and RGDPij but a negative one for the
coefficients of all skilled labor endowment interaction terms. While there is
no clear-cut hypothesis for the sign of the main effect of DSKij, we expect
INT1ij and INT4ij to enter positively and the other interaction terms to
exert a negative impact on FDI (see Carr, Markusen, and Maskus, 2001; and
Markusen and Maskus, 2002).
Note that the sample of 23 parent and 28 host countries covers only mem-
ber countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) and the ten Central and
East European countries (CEEC) that have successfully applied for EUmem-
bership (see the Appendix for a detailed list of economies). Since there was
no change to the composition of the EEA within the sample period, its effect
is captured by the country-pair dummies. However, ten Europe Agreements
between the EU and a CEEC have been ratified within the period considered.
These are the ones with Hungary and Poland in 1994; with Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Romania, and Slovak Republic in 1995; with Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania in 1998; and with Slovenia in 1999 (see the Appendix for further
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details). We capture these agreements by the dummy variable EAij which
takes the value 1 for two economies that ratified the Europe Agreement in a
given year and afterwards. For all other country pairs and years this dummy
variable is zero. Hence, this dummy variable exhibits time and country-pair
variation. By controlling for country-pair and time effects, the corresponding
parameter can be interpreted as a difference-in-difference direct effect of the
Europe Agreements on bilateral FDI.
To simplify the exposition of our econometric approach, we collect all
mentioned variables in the matrix Xn = [EAn,SGDPn,RGDPn,DSKn,
INT1n, ..., INT5n], where Xn is an n× k matrix with n being the number
of observations and k = 9 denoting the number of variables collected in Xn.
The Appendix gives details on the variable sources for both the dependent
(log bilateral outbound FDI) and independent variables. Moreover, Tables
A.1-A.3 in the Appendix provide descriptive statistics of the dependent and
independent variables as well as partial correlation coefficients. We allow for
spatial interdependence in Xn across host countries (since FDI location deci-
sions depend not only on the parent and actual host country characteristics
but also on the characteristics of the competing European host markets).
The spatial weights matrix is defined in the following section, which serves
to aggregate the characteristics of a host market’s competitors. We do so to
account for the possibility that the Europe Agreements not only affect FDI
decisions directly in a particular new entrant but may indirectly affect FDI
decisions in the other competing host markets.
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3 Econometric approach
We consider the following econometric model:
yn = Xnαn + X̄nβn +Dnµn + un (1)
= Znδn + un
where Zn = [Xn, X̄n,Dn] and δn = [α0n,β
0
n,µ
0
n]
0. To simplify notation,
let us refer to a specific country-pair ij in year t by p. The total number of
observations is n =
PP
p=1 Tp, where P denotes the number of unique country-
pairs and Tp is number of observations when country-pair p is observed. P =
MN , where M (N) denotes the number of unique parent (host) countries.
yn is an n×1 vector of observations of the dependent variable (with elements
yijt = logFDIijt), Xn is the n×k matrix of explanatory variables, including
the Europe Agreements dummy variable EAn, and Dn is an n× l matrix of
(country-pair and time) dummy variables, where l = P +max[Tp].
We refer to X̄n as the spatial lag of Xn (see below for further details).
While the panel data-set is unbalanced due to missing elements in yn, X̄n is
computed from the balanced data. If X̄n were based on spatially weighted
averages in the unbalanced panel data-set, we would obtain biased and incon-
sistent estimates of the parameters and the disturbances, even with randomly
missing elements in yn. The reason for the latter is that some missing ob-
servations with a non-zero spatial weight would not be accounted for in the
spatial averages, leading to measurement error. To circumvent this problem,
we define XPT and X̄PT = WPTXPT as the balanced counterparts to Xn
and X̄n, respectively, where PT > n andWPT is a block-diagonal PT ×PT
spatial weighting matrix with MT blocks WN of size N × N . Xn and X̄n
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are derived by eliminating the rows corresponding to missing values in the
dependent variable from XPT and X̄PT , respectively. δn is a (2k+ l+1)× 1
vector of unknown parameters.
Each blockWN ofWPT = IMT ⊗WN refers to a specific parent country
and year, and it includes the spatial weight among FDI-hosts. This weighting
scheme implies that there is only spatial interdependence among the hosts of
a specific parent country in a given year, while there is no such interdepen-
dence across parent countries or across time periods. The diagonal elements
of WN are 0. We define the off-diagonal elements of WN as wjk/w∗, for
j, k = 1,..., N , i.e., j and k run over host countries. In our application, wjk
corresponds to the log ‘natural’ trade flow (exports of j to k plus exports
of k to j) in nominal U.S. dollars averaged over the period 1990 to 2000.
Log natural trade flows are defined as the predictions from a model of bi-
lateral exports. These predictions are referred to as ‘natural’ trade because
they reflect the systematic part of trade flows as suggested by economic the-
ory. Interdependence is established via natural trade flows. The reasoning
is that the multinational’s outside option of serving consumers in that host
country locally, via FDI there, is to supply goods to consumers in that coun-
try via exports from a third country (see Raff, 2004). Natural trade flows
are used in WN because they reflect the trade potential between two mar-
kets as predicted by a gravity model of bilateral trade, accounting not only
for geographical distance and proximity, but also for market size and other
country-specific determinants of trade.4 This weighting scheme supports the
4In our application, log natural trade flows are based on the predictions from a cross-
sectional gravity model of bilateral exports using trade data from the late 1980s and
early 1990s (prior to the estimation period for the FDI model). We include exporter-
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theoretical view that a given parent country’s FDI in a given host country
depends on this country’s and the other host countries’ characteristics.
In the case of row-normalization of WN , w∗ =
PN
k=1wjk is the sum of
the elements in the corresponding row of W. Under maximum row-sum
normalization, w∗ = maxj[
PN
k=1wjk] corresponds to the maximum of these
row-sums. In the former case, the spatial weighting matrix is row-normalized,
and in the latter case it is normalized by the maximal row sum as suggested
by Kelejian and Prucha (2005).
un = yn − Znδn is a vector of disturbances. In the estimation, we guard
against possible heteroskedasticity and correlation of the disturbances across
space and, alternatively, across time. While the latter can be accomplished by
applying a standard HAC estimator as proposed by Newey and West (1987),
spatial HAC (SHAC) estimators have been proposed by Conley (1999) and,
more recently, by Kelejian and Prucha (2007). We apply the SHAC procedure
of Kelejian and Prucha, since it is robust to measurement error of the spatial
distance metric (in our case, natural trade flows). Furthermore, the estimator
and importer-specific fixed effects and the following set of dyad-specific explanatory vari-
ables (we give the coefficients and standard errors in parentheses) in the model to predict
trade flows: log distance (−0.8118, 0.0592), a common language dummy variable (0.5082,
0.0913), a common colonial relationship variable (3.2975, 0.2626), and a dummy variable
indicating whether a dyad represents intranational exports (0.2240, 0.1528). This model
implicitly accounts for multilateral trade resistance terms as indicated by Anderson and
van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004). Model estimation rests upon a quasi-maximum
likelihood poisson model to account for zero-inflated trade data (see Santos Silva and Ten-
reyro, 2007). Data on bilateral exports are taken from the United Nation’s World Trade
Database, distance is measured as the great circle distance between countries’ capitals,
and the dummy variables are gathered from the CIA’s World Factbook.
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of the variance-covariance matrix is based on a set of assumptions that is
satisfied in a wide class of spatial models.
To compute the SHAC variance-covariance matrix of the estimated pa-
rameters, denote the rth and sth variables in the matrix Z for a specific
country-pair and time t as zor,n and zos,n, respectively. Similarly, the values
zo0r,n and zo0s,n refer to an alternative observation o0. Moreover, let us refer
to the estimated elements of the disturbance vector for observations o and
o0 as ûo,n and ûo0,n. The SHAC estimator is based on a distance measure
with entries d∗oo0,n = (woo0,n/w
∗)−1.5 Similar to Xn, we assume that spatial
interdependence of the disturbances only occurs across host countries within
a year for a given parent country. All elements d∗oo0,n with different parent
countries or years and all elements d∗oo0,n where o = o
0 are set to d∗oo0,n = 0.
Additionally, let dn be a critical value determining the radius of spatial in-
terdependence. Hence, spatial interdependence is only assumed for those
observations o and o0, where d∗oo0,n ≤ dn. The SHAC estimator of Kelejian
and Prucha (2007) involves the kernel function K(d∗oo0,n/dn). For the latter,
we assume a Bartlett window which is given by
K(d∗oo0,n/dn) = 1− |d∗oo0,n/dn| ∀ |d∗oo0,n/dn| < 1.
Kelejian and Prucha obtain a consistent estimate for the (r, s)th element of
5Kelejian and Prucha (2007) assume that d∗oo0,n = doo0,n+υoo0,n, where doo0,n is the true
measure of economic ’distance’ (in our case the inverse natural trade flow) between obser-
vations o and o0 and υoo0,n = υo0ot,n is a measurement error where (υoo0,n) is independent
of (εo,n). For convenience, we define w∗ in the same way as inWPT .
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the variance-covariance matrix which is given by
ψ̂rs,n =
1
n
nX
o=1
nX
o0=1
zor,nzo0s,nûo,nûo0,nK(d
∗
oo0,n/dn).
The SHAC-based variance-covariance matrix Ψ̂n = (ψ̂rs,n) may then be used
for hypotheses testing.6 For instance, this is useful to test the hypothesis of
the joint relevance of the spatial lags in the exogenous explanatory variables
in the subsequent empirical analysis.
4 Empirical analysis - the impact of the Eu-
rope Agreements on bilateral FDI in Eu-
rope
For robustness, we employ two different spatial weighting schemes described
above. Both of them are based on natural trade flows among host countries,
but they differ with respect to the normalization method. Most of the existing
applications of spatial econometric models rely on row-normalized matrices
WPT . However, Kelejian and Prucha (2005) point out that it is sufficient to
normalize all entries ofWPT and, hence, ofWPT , by the largest eigenvalue or,
alternatively, by the largest row-sum of WPT . Row-normalization imposes
strong restrictions on the spatial process, since each row ofWPT is normal-
ized differently (hence, only relative economic distance matters but there is
6The estimate Ψ̂n is affected by the missing values in un. However, after including
spatial and eventually time lags of the exogenous variables, spatial or serial autocorrelation
seems to constitute a minor problem with the data at hand.
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no role to play for absolute economic distance). By way of contrast, the
maximum row-sum normalization suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (2005)
implies dividing the whole matrix WPT by a single scalar which preserves
the importance of absolute economic distance along with that of relative dis-
tance for interdependence. Overall, there are potential objections against
row-normalization from a theoretical point of view, at least in the case of
models of multinational firms and trade. For instance, FDI in not too eco-
nomically distant host markets may be complementary in the case of verti-
cally organized multinational networks, where plants are interrelated through
intra-firm trade. The reason is that a larger absolute economic distance be-
tween host markets renders intra-firm trade in goods more costly. However,
a row-normalized weighting scheme does not support any role for economic
distance in absolute terms, since it only relies on relative economic distance
to other host countries in the spatial weighting scheme. To see this, suppose
that one parent country’s host markets exhibit an economic distance which
is ten times that of another parent country. If all economic distances are
the same among the host markets for a parent country, the row-normalized
weighting scheme exhibits identical entries, even though absolute distances
differ by a factor of ten across parent countries. This is not the case for
the alternative weighting scheme suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (2005),
where the absolute role of economic distance is maintained, being in line with
economic theory.
> Table 1 <
Table 1 summarizes our findings for the two least squares dummy vari-
able specifications with fixed country-pair and time effects. Model 1 relies
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on maximum row-sum-normalized spatial weights, whereas Model 2 relies on
row-normalized ones. In our application, there is no qualitative difference in
the estimates between the two models. The parameter estimates are even
quite similar in quantitative terms. In the discussion of the results, we fo-
cus on the results of Model 1 based on the maximum row-sum-normalized
weighting scheme where the explanatory power is marginally higher than
under Model 2. As mentioned before, we guard against possible spatial or,
alternatively, serial correlation of the disturbances by applying Kelejian and
Prucha’s (2007) SHAC estimator and Newey and West’s (1987) HAC esti-
mator for the variance-covariance matrices. It turns out that the difference
between these two estimators is only minor in our application.
The results indicate that parent and host country joint size and parent-
to-host-market relative size are positively related to bilateral outward FDI
as expected (bβSGDP , bβRGDP > 0). Of the variables involving relative factor
endowments DSK (i.e., DSK and INT1, ..., INT5), only INT2 and INT5
enter significantly, using this European sample of countries. The finding
for the former (bβINT2 < 0) is in line with Markusen and Maskus (2002).
The estimate for the latter (bβINT5 > 0) is not supported by the theory
of vertical multinational firms and is not in line with the findings in Carr,
Markusen, and Maskus (2001). However, by using a formulation in levels
rather than logs, Carr, et al. relied on different functional form assumptions,
and did not control for country-pair and time effects in their panel. Also,
their specification did not includeDSK or INT1. This renders a comparison
of their findings with ours difficult.
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Our variable of major interest, the Europe Agreement indicator, is pos-
itive and significant, indicating that it affects bilateral outward FDI. The
coefficient estimate can be interpreted as a difference-in-difference estimate
which compares the change in FDI of country-pairs that ratified Europe
Agreements in a given period to the control group of country-pairs that did
not. The effect of implementing a Europe Agreement exhibits a direct im-
pact on bilateral FDI of about 100(e0.890 − 1) ' 144 percent. This effect is
comparable to the previous evidence on RTA effects on FDI. For instance,
Levi Yeyati, Stein, and Daude (2002a, p. 31) apply an LSDV model with
time effects and estimate a somewhat lower effect of 100(e0.770 − 1) ' 116
percent, using bilateral FDI stock data from the OECD.7 However, there is
also an indirect effect of the Europe Agreements through spatial interdepen-
dence triggered by natural trade flows among host countries. This effect is
captured by the spatially weighted impact of the Europe Agreement dummy
(EAn with a coefficient estimate bβEA ' −1.039). The latter is negative and
significant as expected from recent theoretical work on export-platform FDI
and the threat of plant relocation associated with trade liberalization (Raff,
2004; and Ekholm, Forslid, Markusen, 2007). Note that the indirect effect of
7The estimated impact of the Europe Agreements on FDI also compares well with the
fixed effects estimates of RTAs on bilateral trade. For instance, the data used in Glick
and Rose (2002) support an effect of regional trade agreements all over the world on
bilateral trade flows of about 100(e0.848−1) ' 133 percent (when including time dummies
as we do), and Baier and Bergstrand (2007, p. 20) report an effect of about 58 percent.
Estimating a fixed country-pair and time effects model using our data and specification
without any spatially weighted variables, one obtains an EA parameter of 0.789 and a
(heteroskedasticity-robust) standard error of 0.111. This corresponds to an impact of the
Europe Agreements on FDI of about 100(e0.789 − 1) ' 120 percent.
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the Europe Agreements depends also on a host country’s economic distance
from other host markets. Hence, the overall impact of Europe Agreement
membership on inward FDI (from the average parent country in the sample)
will differ across host countries.
In a multi-country world, the other explanatory variables also exhibit
bilateral and third-country effects. For instance, not only do bilateral relative
and absolute factor endowments (i.e., country size) matter, but endowments
of all competing host markets are relevant (see also Head, Ries, and Swenson,
1995, and Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton, 2007, for the inclusion
of the impact of exogenous explanatory variables of adjacent/non-distant
locations of FDI).8 In our application, all elements of Xn except the spatially
weighted effect of INT5 enter significantly. This is reflected in a significant
Wald statistic testing the joint significance of all elements of Xn.
Overall, the opposite signs of the bilateral and the spatially weighted
effects of both EA and SGDP support the hypotheses generated by mod-
els of export-platform FDI, where FDI decisions are substitutive across host
markets (see Raff, 2004; and Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2007).9 Even
8For instance, a host market’s growth is not sufficient to stimulate bilateral inward
FDI. What matters is whether it grows faster or slower than the rest of the competing
host countries.
9In the sensitivity analysis summarized in the Appendix, we investigate the dynamics of
the adjustment of bilateral FDI stocks to changes in the explanatory variables. We accom-
plish this by adding once time-lagged explanatory variables to the model. Note that it is
not possible to add further lags without losing countries such as the Czech Republic or the
Slovak Republic from the sample. However, the contemporaneous and the once-lagged de-
terminants are highly correlated (see Table A.2 in the Appendix), rendering identification
of the dynamic pattern difficult. For instance, the partial correlation coefficient between
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though some of the coefficients of the spatially weighted variables are larger
in absolute value than the corresponding ones for the unweighted variables,
the impact of changes in a single third host country on bilateral FDI is rather
small. The reason is that we need to multiply these estimates by the third
country’s spatial weight. The latter is much smaller than unity for all host
countries due to row-normalization of WN . However, what happens in all
third host countries together may be more important for bilateral FDI than
what happens in the target country. Of course, traditional explanatory vari-
ables do not necessarily take this into account, because they do not capture
directly third-country effects.
In Table 2, we compute the associated direct and indirect effects of the
Europe Agreements on bilateral FDI of the WEC on both the WEC and
the CEEC for each of the four ratification steps (1994: Hungary, Poland;
1995: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovak Republic; 1998: Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania; 1999: Slovenia). We use parent plus host country real
GDP as weights to compute average predicted changes in inward FDI for
each host country in the sample. For each of the ratification years, the direct
and indirect effects on FDI are displayed in the first two columns. The third
column displays the overall effect, 100(eβEAEAijt+βEAEAijt−1). Therefore, the
overall effect does not correspond exactly to the arithmetic sum of the direct
and indirect effects.
> Table 2 <
within transformed EAijt and EAij,t−1 is 0.87 and that of their spatially weighted coun-
terparts is 0.89 under row normalization and also under maximum row normalization (see
Table A.3 in the Appendix for a summary of the results).
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Of course, inward FDI of the WEC fromWEC parents does not entertain
any direct effect of a Europe Agreement ratification. Yet, these countries face
a negative indirect impact from some of the CEEC ratifications. The largest
indirect effects in Table 2 indicate the most important trading partners of the
ratifying CEEC in the corresponding period. By and large, Table 2 indicates
that the negative indirect impact on the average WEC host country’s inward
FDI from the WEC was largest in 1995 (when four agreements had been
ratified with CEEC) and smallest in 1999 (when only one agreement had
been ratified with Slovenia). In the same years, the CEEC had faced the
largest and smallest average positive direct impact.
Note that the impact of EA ratification on an involved CEEC is much
larger than that on a WEC. The reason is that the number of involved CEEC
is small as compared to the number of WEC. Therefore, the overall impact
on FDI into a CEEC is much larger than the one on FDI into a WEC. Also,
there is no direct effect on intra-WEC bilateral outbound FDI in Table 2.
In fact, the Europe Agreements did not involve any change in trade barriers
within Western Europe. However, the WEC face negative indirect effects,
since trade barriers have declined due to EA ratification of the WEC with
the CEEC.
Notice that even Hungary and Poland experienced a positive direct im-
pact in 1995. The EU grew that year with the addition of Austria, Finland,
and Sweden, which cast a large ‘shadow’ on the aspirations to the member-
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ships of Hungary and Poland.10 The weighted negative indirect impact on
the CEEC had in all years been far too small to outweigh the positive direct
one, on average. The positive overall effect in the CEEC had been several
times larger than the negative one on the WEC in absolute terms.
Altogether, the Europe Agreements lead to relocation of FDI to the rati-
fying CEEC countries. The associated negative impact had been largest for
those host economies exhibiting large natural trade flows with these CEEC.
This holds in particular for Austria, Germany and the Scandinavian countries
in several of the years considered.
> Figures 1-4 <
Figures 1-4 graphically illustrate the effects summarized in Table 2. This
exercise confirms that a small economic distance (associated with a high level
of natural bilateral trade flows) is associated with a small geographical dis-
tance and/or a large market size in terms of GDP. Accordingly, the negative
indirect effects of the Europe Agreements are strongest for large and/or ad-
jacent countries. Due to their relatively small market size, interdependence
among the CEEC ceteris paribus tends to be weaker than between a CEEC
and a WEC.
Ignoring spatial interdependence by excluding the indirect effects on FDI
seems harmful. For instance, a naïve LSDV estimator based only on the
direct effects (through Xn) leads to an estimate of the Europe Agreement
effects on bilateral FDI from the WEC in the CEEC of 100(e0.789− 1) ≈ 120
10Since Hungary and Poland implicitly ratified an agreement with only three economies
in 1995, they face a smaller direct positive effect than Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania,
and Slovak Republic, who ratified their agreements with 15 countries in 1995.
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percent for each and every ratifying economy. Clearly, these estimates are
rejected at one percent by the corresponding Wald tests of Table 2.
5 Discussion and policy recommendations
The limited availability of resources — such as factor endowments — naturally
establishes interdependence in the allocation decisions about these resources.
We provide empirical evidence that this is true for a parent country’s out-
bound foreign direct investment (FDI) across a set of host countries. Hence,
economic policy aimed at attracting FDI in a particular subset of host coun-
tries will cause effects not only there but also in other host countries. This
can happen even in the absence of any change in the economic environment
in the other host countries.
This paper’s focus is on the consequences of preferential trade liberal-
ization, i.e., the partial or full elimination of tariffs among a subset of the
world economies. We argue that preferential trade liberalization causes ef-
fects on the involved countries but also on other host countries. And it not
only affects trade (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2002) but it extends to
FDI as well. One reason for the latter is the importance of export plat-
forms in multinational networks. If tariffs are reduced or fully eliminated in
a subset of economies, it becomes cheaper for multinationals to deliver goods
to consumers inside the liberalizing area from export platforms within this
area. Hence, we would expect preferential trade liberalization to lead to a
redirection of FDI into the liberalizing area. On the one hand, this increases
bilateral FDI of parent countries into the free trade area. On the other
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hand, it reduces FDI in countries outside this area. An assessment of the
consequences of preferential trade liberalization on FDI ought to take into
account both effects. At least, such an analysis might help in understanding
the reasons and strengths of repercussions against such liberalizations from
outside a free trade area. Moreover, this delivers estimates of the net effects
on a parent country’s total outbound FDI, which consists of both preferential
trade liberalization-induced FDI creation and diversion effects.
The ratification of the Europe Agreements entails a preferential trade
liberalization scenario along the lines described before. We identified direct
positive effects on bilateral FDI between the Western and the involved Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries. The estimated direct effects of Europe
Agreement ratification in the preferred models are similar to those obtained
from models that ignore any indirect effects. They amount to about 120-135
percent of FDI of the Western European parent countries in the involved
Central and Eastern European economies. This depends upon the partici-
pant and the year considered. In comparison, the negative indirect effects
on third host countries are small but ubiquitous in Europe. They amount
to about -2 to -9 percent for the whole block of Western European host
countries, and they are similar in size for the non-participating Central and
Eastern European countries. Although the positive direct effects on Western
Europe’s FDI in Central and Eastern Europe are large percentage-wise, they
are rather small in absolute terms. By way of contrast, within Western Eu-
rope the negative indirect effects on FDI are small percentage-wise but large
in absolute terms. Hence, preferential trade liberalization between Western
and Central and Eastern Europe has caused a reasonably strong reallocation
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of FDI from Western Europe into Central and Eastern Europe.
Our results seem relevant from various standpoints. First, they suggest
that welfare analysis of trade liberalization should not attribute effects to
goods trade alone but should also consider the associated consequences for
factor movements. Second, our findings indicate that a sizable stimulus of
investment in one country or region eventually causes a reduction of invest-
ment in other countries or regions. Third, enlargements of existing free trade
areas typically involve strong percentage-wise direct effects on FDI in the
new participant economies but smaller indirect ones in the incumbent coun-
tries. As a consequence, welfare gains tend to be strongly concentrated in
new member countries. Fourth, our results suggest that there was a mod-
erate percentage-wise reduction in inbound FDI within Western Europe in
response to the ratification of the Europe Agreements in the 1990s. This
reduction was fairly unevenly distributed across host countries, depending
on their geographical location and economic integration with the other Eu-
ropean economies. Hence, redistributive measures aimed at a more equal
allocation of gains and losses from economic integration should pay atten-
tion to a country’s geographical and economic environment. Econometric
methods taking interdependence across macro-economic units into account
can help identify which units are (favorably or unfavorably) exposed to the
consequences of preferential trade liberalization.
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6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the role of the Europe Agreements on bilateral FDI
within Europe. These agreements were designed to liberalize trade between
the EUmember countries on the one hand and the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries that had applied for EU membership on the other hand. Our
analysis indicates that regional trade agreements are important for bilateral
FDI. General equilibrium theory points to the interdependence of economies.
By and large we would expect FDI activities across adjacent host markets to
be complementary, if local foreign market seeking motives dominate (i.e., if
horizontal FDI prevails and the multi-plant economies of scale are huge). By
way of contrast, if low-cost seeking motives are the driving force behind FDI
(i.e., vertical motives or export-platform FDI dominate), we would expect
the activities to be substitutive across adjacent host markets since multina-
tional firms will tend to supply their goods not only to consumers in that
host market.
In general, the interdependence across markets will depend on the eco-
nomic proximity across the host markets, which can be measured by natural
bilateral trade flows among the host markets. We hypothesize that a large
amount of natural (or predicted) trade flows between two host countries indi-
cates that consumers in one of the two markets could be served cheaply from
the other one. In that case, a given parent country’s FDI in one of the two
host countries should substitute FDI in the other. The empirical analysis of
bilateral FDI needs to account for third market influences that decline in eco-
nomic proximity. Accordingly, it seems natural to apply recently developed
methods for spatially dependent data. In this paper, we applied a spatial
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HAC estimator of the variance-covariance matrix developed by Kelejian and
Prucha (2007) for estimation and testing.
In our sample of bilateral outbound FDI stocks within Europe, we find
strong evidence for the impact of regional trade agreements on FDI. Also, our
results indicate that spatial dependence is present in the data. This leads to
non-trivial effects of the Europe Agreements on bilateral FDI. Computing the
effect for all of the agreement ratification events on 28 host countries’ inward
FDI fromWestern European countries, we obtain the following results. First,
there was a negative impact on Western Europe, which was strongest in
1995 (when four agreements had been ratified) and smallest in 1999 (when
only a single one had been ratified). Second, in the same years, the CEEC
faced the strongest positive effects on average. Third, the negative effects on
FDI into Western Europe had always been much smaller than the positive
ones on FDI into Central and Eastern Europe. Altogether, the estimation
results point to a relocation of FDI from Western European host countries
to Eastern European host countries flowing from the Europe Agreements.
This is consistent with the prevalence of export-platform FDI, where foreign
subsidiaries are located in host markets from which large consumer bases can
be served cheaply.
For economic policy, our results confirm the strong link between trade and
foreign direct investment. In particular, we find that trade policy as reflected
in RTA has an impact not only on trade but also on FDI. Trade liberalization
of a set of parent countries with some host markets leads to a relocation of
FDI from other hosts into the liberalizing ones. This suggests that trade
regionalism (i.e., liberalization with a subset of countries in the world econ-
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omy) for a given parent country exerts positive direct effects on FDI flows
in some host markets and indirect negative ones on others. However, the in-
direct negative effects in percent, at least for trade liberalization in Europe,
tend to be small as compared to the direct positive ones. These results are
timely given the ongoing enlargement of regional trade agreements.
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Appendix: Data and descriptive statistics
1. Data on foreign direct investment
We use data on bilateral outward FDI stock into Europe as published by
UNCTAD (FDI Country profiles), covering the period 1989-2001.
Parent country coverage:
Our sample contains a total of 24 parent economies. WEC: Austria, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. CEEC:
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slo-
vak Republic, Slovenia.
Host country coverage:
There are 28 host countries in the sample. WEC: Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom. CEEC: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia.
2. Data on country size and factor endowments
Real GDP figures at constant U.S. dollars (base year is 2000) are available
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. A country’s skilled
labor endowment is measured by the gross secondary school enrolment from
the same source.
3. Signing and ratification of the Europe Agreements
The Europe Agreements between the members of the European Union and
Central and Eastern European countries have been signed/ratified in the
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following years: Bulgaria (1993/1995), Czech Republic (1993/1995), Estonia
(1995/1998), Hungary (1991/1994), Latvia (1995/1998), Lithuania (1995/1998),
Poland (1991/1994), Romania (1993/1995), Slovak Republic (1993/1995),
Slovenia (1996/1999).
4. Descriptive statistics
Tables A.1-A.3 summarize the descriptive statistics of the untransformed
variables and the correlation matrices of the within transformed variables
under maximum row normalization (Table A.2) and row normalization (Table
A.3).
> Table A.1 - Descriptives <
> Tables A.2 and A.3 - Correlation matrices <
The correlation matrix also contains once time-lagged exogenous variables
which are used in the sensitivity analysis below.
5. Sensitivity analysis: adding once-lagged explanatory vari-
ables to the model
Table A.4 summarizes our findings from a sensitivity analysis, in which we
added once time-lagged exogenous variables to the model. The results indi-
cate that many of the estimated coefficients are insignificant. The reasons for
this are the high partial correlation coefficients among the contemporaneous
and the once-lagged within transformed determinants (see Tables A.2 and
A.3).
> Table A.4 - Adjustment dynamics <
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Table 1: The impact of the Europe Agreements on bilateral FDI in Europe; LSDV - estimates
β β
Explanatory variables SHAC
Newey-
West SHAC
Newey-
West
Unweighted exogenous variables
     EAijt: Dummy variable for Europe Agreements 0.8904 0.1259 0.1287 *** 1.0221 0.1250 0.1281 ***
     SGDPijt: log(GDPit+GDPjt) 1.7316 0.9240 0.9758 * 2.5240 1.1055 1.1657 **
     RGDPijt: (log GDPit - log GDPjt) 1.7582 0.4282 0.4372 *** 1.3538 0.4650 0.4723 ***
     DSKijt: (SKit - SKjt) -0.0497 0.0552 0.0565 -0.0661 0.0585 0.0606
     INT1ijt: DSKijt×RGDPijt×I(SKit≤SKjt) -0.0012 0.0010 0.0011 -0.0011 0.0010 0.0011
     INT2ijt: DSKijt×RGDPijt×I(SKit>SKjt) -0.0034 0.0012 0.0012 *** -0.0035 0.0013 0.0013 ***
     INT3ijt: DSKijt×SGDPijt×I(SKit>SKjt) 0.0017 0.0020 0.0020 0.0022 0.0021 0.0022
     INT4ijt: DSKijt×SGDPijt×I(Skit≤SKjt) -0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 -0.0026 0.0021 0.0022
     INT5ijt: DSKijt
2×(log DISTij) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 **
Spatially weighted variables
     EAijt -1.0386 0.3685 0.3670 *** -0.9601 0.3056 0.2940 ***
     SGDPijt -11.2784 1.6825 1.6050 *** -12.2715 2.9676 3.0436 ***
     RGDPijt 7.6752 1.2496 1.2478 *** 7.6099 1.7404 1.7670 ***
     DSKijt -0.6590 0.3095 0.3407 ** -0.8217 0.2934 0.3238 ***
     INT1ijt 0.0181 0.0094 0.0106 * 0.0038 0.0076 0.0086
     INT2ijt -0.0310 0.0097 0.0104 *** -0.0319 0.0092 0.0099 ***
     INT3ijt 0.0255 0.0118 0.0130 ** 0.0316 0.0112 0.0123 ***
     INT4ijt -0.0237 0.0116 0.0127 ** -0.0299 0.0110 0.0121 ***
     INT5ijt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
σ2 0.5346 0.5459
R2 0.9887 0.9884
p-values of χ2-tests p-values of χ2-tests
Fixed country-pair effects 0.000 0.000
Fixed time effects 0.000 0.000
Spatially weighted X 0.000 0.000
Note: The estimation is based on 3373 observations. To calculate the SHAC-standard errors we use the Bartlett-window with cut-
off 0.2 which implies that 75% of the observations get the non-zero weight by the Bartlett window. The Newey-West estimates of
the standard errors use one time-lag. *** significant at 1%;  ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
NORMALIZED BY LARGEST ROW 
SUM
Model 2Model 1
Std. Std.
 ROW NORMALIZED
Table 2: Dissecting the overall impact of the Europe Agreements on western Europe's bilateral outbound FDI into Europe (figures are percentage changes)
Host countries Direct Indirect Overall Direct Indirect Overall Direct Indirect Overall Direct Indirect Overall
Austria 0.00 -5.14 -5.14 0.00 -9.89 -9.89 0.00 -4.77 -4.77 0.00 -2.50 -2.50
Belgium 0.00 -4.51 -4.51 0.00 -9.08 -9.08 0.00 -5.04 -5.04 0.00 -2.23 -2.23
Denmark 0.00 -4.31 -4.31 0.00 -8.17 -8.17 0.00 -4.85 -4.85 0.00 -1.93 -1.93
Finland 0.00 -4.45 -4.45 0.00 -7.96 -7.96 0.00 -6.08 -6.08 0.00 -1.88 -1.88
France 0.00 -4.47 -4.47 0.00 -10.23 -10.23 0.00 -5.71 -5.71 0.00 -2.46 -2.46
Germany 0.00 -5.11 -5.11 0.00 -11.94 -11.94 0.00 -6.99 -6.99 0.00 -2.80 -2.80
Greece 0.00 -3.99 -3.99 0.00 -8.07 -8.07 0.00 -3.72 -3.72 0.00 -1.83 -1.83
Iceland 0.00 -2.36 -2.36 0.00 -3.66 -3.66 0.00 -1.42 -1.42 0.00 -0.83 -0.83
Ireland 0.00 -4.14 -4.14 0.00 -7.74 -7.74 0.00 -4.28 -4.28 0.00 -1.88 -1.88
Italy 0.00 -4.71 -4.71 0.00 -10.84 -10.84 0.00 -5.84 -5.84 0.00 -2.72 -2.72
Luxembourg 0.00 -3.36 -3.36 0.00 -5.95 -5.95 0.00 -2.60 -2.60 0.00 -1.49 -1.49
Netherlands 0.00 -4.65 -4.65 0.00 -9.62 -9.62 0.00 -5.48 -5.48 0.00 -2.33 -2.33
Norway 0.00 -4.41 -4.41 0.00 -8.40 -8.40 0.00 -5.24 -5.24 0.00 -1.99 -1.99
Portugal 0.00 -4.01 -4.01 0.00 -7.68 -7.68 0.00 -3.99 -3.99 0.00 -1.87 -1.87
Spain 0.00 -4.38 -4.38 0.00 -9.41 -9.41 0.00 -5.15 -5.15 0.00 -2.27 -2.27
Sweden 0.00 -4.84 -4.84 0.00 -8.82 -8.82 0.00 -6.11 -6.11 0.00 -2.12 -2.12
Switzerland 0.00 -4.44 -4.44 0.00 -8.95 -8.95 0.00 -4.59 -4.59 0.00 -2.29 -2.29
United Kingdom 0.00 -4.32 -4.32 0.00 -9.85 -9.85 0.00 -5.55 -5.55 0.00 -2.34 -2.34
Western European Countries (WEC)e 0.00 -4.46 -4.46 0.00 -9.42 -9.42 0.00 -5.54 -5.54 0.00 -2.27 -2.27
Bulgaria 0.00 -3.21 -3.21 135.65 -4.82 123.89 0.00 -2.10 -2.10 0.00 -1.32 -1.32
Czech Republic 0.00 -4.42 -4.42 134.29 -5.91 119.90 0.00 -4.03 -4.03 0.00 -2.09 -2.09
Estonia 0.00 -2.79 -2.79 0.00 -4.28 -4.28 135.89 -4.44 125.08 0.00 -0.93 -0.93
Hungary 124.27 -2.28 118.72 10.47 -8.85 0.40 0.00 -3.98 -3.98 0.00 -2.15 -2.15
Latvia 0.00 -3.20 -3.20 0.00 -4.77 -4.77 135.67 -4.44 124.84 0.00 -1.03 -1.03
Lithuania 0.00 -2.66 -2.66 0.00 -3.87 -3.87 135.82 -4.48 124.91 0.00 -0.82 -0.82
Poland 119.65 -2.19 114.31 12.77 -8.21 3.15 0.00 -5.03 -5.03 0.00 -1.94 -1.94
Romania 0.00 -3.89 -3.89 134.68 -5.60 121.03 0.00 -3.07 -3.07 0.00 -1.55 -1.55
Slovak Republic 0.00 -4.43 -4.43 135.51 -5.69 121.65 0.00 -3.08 -3.08 0.00 -1.91 -1.91
Slovenia 0.00 -3.82 -3.82 0.00 -6.99 -6.99 0.00 -2.74 -2.74 135.51 0.00 135.51
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC)e 27.14 -3.27 23.15 56.38 -5.98 46.94 38.30 -3.78 32.72 13.03 -1.41 11.63
Notes:
The overall effect is the geometric sum of the direct effect, the indirect effect, and the spatial multiplier effect.
a Europe Agreement ratification with Hungary and Poland.
b Europe Agreement ratification with Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovak Republic.
c Europe Agreement ratification with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
d Europe Agreement ratification with Slovenia.
e Numbers reflect unweighted averages.
Percentage changes in FDI due to the following effects
1994a 1995b 1998c 1999d
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Minimum Maximum
Unweighted bilateral FDI stocks 5.249 3.594 -7.497 12.517
Unweighted exogenous variables
     EAijt: Dummy variable for Europe Agreements 0.205 0.404 0.000 1.000
     SGDPijt: log(GDPit+GDPjt) 26.990 1.166 23.098 28.859
     RGDPijt: (log GDPit - log GDPjt) -0.002 2.202 -5.715 5.883
     DSKijt: (SKit - SKjt) 1.777 27.348 -125.494 125.494
     INT1ijt: DSKijt×RGDPijt×I(SKit≤SKjt) 9.889 46.886 -129.651 641.722
     INT2ijt: DSKijt×RGDPijt×I(SKit>SKjt) 9.865 39.625 -129.651 533.792
     INT3ijt: DSKijt×SGDPijt×I(DSKijt>0) 297.946 453.503 0.000 3539.557
     INT4ijt: DSKijt×SGDPijt×I(DSKijt≤0) 251.526 454.574 0.000 3539.557
     INT5ijt: DSKijt
2×(log DISTij) 4758.966 9351.549 0.000 95937.200
Note: GDP refers to real gross domestic product in US dollars (base year is 2000), SK is gross secondary school
enrolment in percent, and DIST is the great circle distance between two countries' capitals.
Table A.2: Correlations of within transformed explanatory variables; maximum row normalization
Time lags
Unweighted Spatially weighted Unweighted Spatially weighted
EAijt SGDPijt RGDPijt DSKijt INT1ijt INT2ijt INT3ijt INT4ijt INT5ijt EAijt SGDPijt RGDPijt DSKijt INT1ijt INT2ijt INT3ijt INT4ijt INT5ijt EAijt-1 SGDPijt-1 RGDPijt-1 DSKijt-1 INT1ijt-1 INT2ijt-1 INT3ijt-1 INT4ijt-1 INT5ijt-1 EAijt-1 SGDPijt-1 RGDPijt-1 DSKijt-1 INT1ijt-1 INT2ijt-1 INT3ijt-1 INT4ijt-1 INT5ijt-1
Unweighted
EAijt 1.00
SGDPijt 0.50 1.00
RGDPijt 0.00 0.00 1.00
DSKijt 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.00
INT1ijt 0.10 0.09 -0.14 -0.44 1.00
INT2ijt 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.44 0.10 1.00
INT3ijt 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.76 0.00 0.68 1.00
INT4ijt 0.07 0.09 -0.13 -0.76 0.68 0.00 -0.14 1.00
INT5ijt 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.58 1.00
Spatially weighted
EAijt 0.63 0.63 -0.07 -0.01 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.17 1.00
SGDPijt -0.38 -0.43 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.22 -0.18 -0.07 -0.15 -0.46 1.00
RGDPijt 0.03 0.08 0.04 -0.09 0.04 -0.13 -0.12 0.01 -0.07 0.17 -0.22 1.00
DSKijt 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.64 -0.10 0.37 0.66 -0.32 0.30 0.03 0.01 -0.02 1.00 1.00
INT1ijt 0.08 0.03 -0.28 -0.18 0.27 0.12 0.01 0.26 0.13 0.10 -0.12 -0.09 -0.37 0.22
INT2ijt 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.46 0.08 0.50 0.66 -0.07 0.48 0.08 -0.10 0.03 0.63 -0.03 1.00
INT3ijt -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.60 -0.01 0.44 0.74 -0.17 0.46 0.03 0.07 -0.10 0.88 0.67 0.81 1.00
INT4ijt -0.02 0.00 -0.21 -0.45 0.17 -0.14 -0.28 0.38 0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.09 -0.76 0.31 -0.15 -0.37 1.00
INT5ijt 0.13 0.25 -0.07 0.37 0.08 0.45 0.63 0.05 0.57 0.21 -0.14 -0.07 0.44 0.06 0.80 0.76 0.16 1.00
Timelags
Unweighted
EAijt-1 0.87 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.57 -0.33 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.13 1.00
SGDPijt-1 0.45 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.55 -0.31 -0.04 0.01 -0.27 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.25 0.48 1.00
RGDPijt-1 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.18 -0.14 0.14 0.13 -0.13 0.00 -0.12 -0.15 -0.04 0.09 -0.18 -0.01 -0.01 -0.20 -0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00
DSKijt-1 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.89 -0.39 0.39 0.67 -0.67 0.00 -0.04 -0.11 -0.13 0.55 0.27 0.36 0.48 -0.42 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.27 1.00
INT1ijt-1 0.16 0.14 -0.16 -0.38 0.89 0.11 0.01 0.60 0.47 0.17 -0.14 0.06 -0.09 0.12 0.08 -0.01 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.11 -0.18 -0.42 1.00
INT2ijt-1 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.38 0.11 0.89 0.60 0.01 0.47 0.09 -0.32 -0.16 0.27 0.00 0.39 0.32 -0.12 0.37 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.42 0.13 1.00
INT3ijt-1 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.69 -0.02 0.59 0.89 -0.15 0.50 0.09 -0.24 -0.15 0.53 0.26 0.51 0.58 -0.25 0.51 0.09 0.10 0.20 0.77 0.00 0.64 1.00
INT4ijt-1 0.10 0.11 -0.18 -0.69 0.59 -0.02 -0.15 0.89 0.50 0.16 -0.07 0.05 -0.32 0.14 -0.07 -0.17 0.38 0.05 0.09 0.10 -0.20 -0.77 0.64 0.00 -0.18 1.00
INT5ijt-1 0.19 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.49 0.55 0.55 0.90 0.21 -0.21 -0.07 0.23 0.07 0.39 0.37 0.04 0.49 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.52 0.58 0.58 1.00
Spatially weighted
EAijt-1 0.57 0.65 -0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.89 -0.40 0.15 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.21 0.63 0.59 -0.10 -0.03 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.19 1.00
SGDPijt-1 -0.44 -0.54 -0.08 -0.05 -0.07 -0.17 -0.14 -0.06 -0.14 -0.54 0.85 -0.19 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.15 -0.39 -0.41 -0.13 -0.09 -0.13 -0.28 -0.22 -0.07 -0.20 -0.47 1.00
RGDPijt-1 0.02 0.13 0.09 -0.05 0.01 -0.11 -0.10 -0.02 -0.08 0.19 -0.17 0.82 0.00 -0.13 0.02 -0.09 -0.13 -0.10 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.09 0.03 -0.15 -0.13 0.02 -0.08 0.16 -0.21 1.00
DSKijt-1 -0.02 0.03 0.16 0.59 -0.12 0.31 0.57 -0.31 0.24 0.00 0.04 -0.14 0.85 -0.34 0.49 0.72 -0.68 0.33 -0.01 0.04 0.17 0.65 -0.14 0.30 0.60 -0.39 0.22 0.00 0.02 -0.04 1.00
INT1ijt-1 0.15 0.07 -0.31 -0.17 0.28 0.12 0.02 0.26 0.15 0.20 -0.32 0.17 -0.27 0.77 0.21 -0.03 0.49 0.28 0.12 0.03 -0.35 -0.24 0.37 0.15 0.00 0.33 0.20 0.16 -0.18 -0.05 -0.41 1.00
INT2ijt-1 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.41 0.09 0.47 0.60 -0.04 0.44 0.15 -0.25 0.02 0.52 0.24 0.87 0.68 -0.12 0.71 0.06 0.11 -0.02 0.39 0.12 0.45 0.57 -0.05 0.43 0.13 -0.17 0.05 0.53 0.30 1.00
INT3ijt-1 -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.54 -0.02 0.39 0.67 -0.16 0.39 0.02 0.02 -0.16 0.76 -0.05 0.67 0.84 -0.34 0.63 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.58 -0.03 0.36 0.69 -0.21 0.40 0.02 0.08 -0.11 0.87 -0.06 0.73 1.00
INT4ijt-1 0.00 -0.02 -0.24 -0.43 0.18 -0.13 -0.27 0.37 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.08 -0.66 0.55 -0.13 -0.34 0.83 0.13 0.00 -0.02 -0.26 -0.51 0.22 -0.13 -0.30 0.46 0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.06 -0.81 0.66 -0.12 -0.40 1.00
INT5ijt-1 0.15 0.24 -0.10 0.30 0.10 0.39 0.56 0.09 0.52 0.25 -0.23 -0.03 0.35 0.31 0.67 0.64 0.18 0.88 0.14 0.23 -0.12 0.27 0.14 0.38 0.55 0.12 0.55 0.24 -0.17 -0.08 0.31 0.41 0.73 0.70 0.24 1.00
Table A.3: Correlations of within transformed explanatory variables, row normalization
Time lags
Unweighted Spatially weighted Unweighted Spatially weighted
EAijt SGDPijt RGDPijt DSKijt INT1ijt INT2ijt INT3ijt INT4ijt INT5ijt EAijt SGDPijt RGDPijt DSKijt INT1ijt INT2ijt INT3ijt INT4ijt INT5ijt EAijt-1 SGDPijt-1 RGDPijt-1 DSKijt-1 INT1ijt-1 INT2ijt-1 INT3ijt-1 INT4ijt-1 INT5ijt-1 EAijt-1 SGDPijt-1 RGDPijt-1 DSKijt-1 INT1ijt-1 INT2ijt-1 INT3ijt-1 INT4ijt-1 INT5ijt-1
Unweighted
EAijt 1.00
SGDPijt 0.50 1.00
RGDPijt 0.00 0.00 1.00
DSKijt 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.00
INT1ijt 0.10 0.09 -0.14 -0.44 1.00
INT2ijt 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.44 0.10 1.00
INT3ijt 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.76 0.00 0.68 1.00
INT4ijt 0.07 0.09 -0.13 -0.76 0.68 0.00 -0.14 1.00
INT5ijt 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.58 1.00
Spatially weighted
EAijt 0.62 0.64 -0.05 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.15 1.00
SGDPijt 0.50 0.90 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.20 0.72 1.00
RGDPijt -0.04 0.25 0.71 0.13 -0.16 0.04 0.06 -0.13 -0.04 -0.10 0.23 1.00
DSKijt 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.68 -0.09 0.52 0.74 -0.29 0.38 -0.02 0.03 0.19 1.00
INT1ijt 0.15 0.09 -0.29 -0.19 0.26 0.10 -0.01 0.26 0.12 0.26 0.14 -0.45 -0.37 1.00
INT2ijt 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.50 0.07 0.66 0.72 -0.07 0.54 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.68 0.18 1.00
INT3ijt 0.09 0.15 0.06 0.63 0.01 0.63 0.83 -0.14 0.55 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.89 -0.02 0.86 1.00
INT4ijt 0.15 0.17 -0.18 -0.44 0.19 -0.12 -0.27 0.38 0.03 0.22 0.21 -0.29 -0.71 0.72 -0.12 -0.31 1.00
INT5ijt 0.20 0.31 -0.05 0.39 0.07 0.57 0.66 0.04 0.60 0.27 0.35 -0.08 0.50 0.31 0.82 0.81 0.20 1.00
Timelags
Unweighted
EAijt-1 0.87 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.55 0.52 -0.04 0.00 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.19 1.00
SGDPijt-1 0.45 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.54 0.85 0.28 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.29 0.48 1.00
RGDPijt-1 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.18 -0.14 0.14 0.13 -0.13 0.00 -0.09 0.17 0.66 0.13 -0.30 0.04 0.07 -0.17 -0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00
DSKijt-1 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.89 -0.39 0.39 0.67 -0.67 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.17 0.61 -0.21 0.42 0.56 -0.42 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.27 1.00
INT1ijt-1 0.16 0.14 -0.16 -0.38 0.89 0.11 0.01 0.60 0.47 0.15 0.09 -0.19 -0.09 0.29 0.08 0.02 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.11 -0.18 -0.42 1.00
INT2ijt-1 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.38 0.11 0.89 0.60 0.01 0.47 0.11 0.15 0.03 0.44 0.10 0.56 0.55 -0.08 0.50 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.42 0.13 1.00
INT3ijt-1 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.69 -0.02 0.59 0.89 -0.15 0.50 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.64 -0.03 0.60 0.72 -0.23 0.56 0.09 0.10 0.20 0.77 0.00 0.64 1.00
INT4ijt-1 0.10 0.11 -0.18 -0.69 0.59 -0.02 -0.15 0.89 0.50 0.13 0.09 -0.18 -0.31 0.28 -0.07 -0.15 0.40 0.05 0.09 0.10 -0.20 -0.77 0.64 0.00 -0.18 1.00
INT5ijt-1 0.19 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.49 0.55 0.55 0.90 0.19 0.22 -0.06 0.32 0.14 0.46 0.49 0.07 0.54 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.52 0.58 0.58 1.00
Spatially weighted
EAijt-1 0.55 0.66 -0.05 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.89 0.74 -0.10 -0.02 0.21 0.08 0.10 0.20 0.27 0.62 0.59 -0.07 -0.01 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.18 1.00
SGDPijt-1 0.46 0.89 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.19 0.65 0.98 0.27 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.34 0.49 0.87 0.22 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.20 0.69 1.00
RGDPijt-1 -0.08 0.20 0.66 0.13 -0.17 0.03 0.06 -0.13 -0.04 -0.18 0.18 0.93 0.18 -0.46 0.03 0.07 -0.27 -0.08 -0.07 0.27 0.71 0.19 -0.23 0.03 0.10 -0.19 -0.06 -0.15 0.25 1.00
DSKijt-1 -0.02 0.04 0.18 0.61 -0.10 0.43 0.64 -0.28 0.31 -0.07 0.03 0.25 0.89 -0.39 0.57 0.77 -0.67 0.39 -0.01 0.06 0.19 0.69 -0.13 0.43 0.69 -0.36 0.30 -0.05 0.05 0.27 1.00
INT1ijt-1 0.21 0.15 -0.30 -0.16 0.25 0.09 0.00 0.23 0.12 0.36 0.20 -0.46 -0.31 0.88 0.16 0.00 0.63 0.29 0.18 0.05 -0.34 -0.24 0.34 0.12 -0.03 0.32 0.18 0.30 0.12 -0.54 -0.42 1.00
INT2ijt-1 0.12 0.18 0.04 0.45 0.08 0.60 0.67 -0.04 0.51 0.17 0.21 0.02 0.61 0.20 0.92 0.80 -0.06 0.77 0.11 0.16 0.04 0.45 0.11 0.61 0.65 -0.06 0.50 0.14 0.19 0.02 0.59 0.24 1.00
INT3ijt-1 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.57 0.00 0.55 0.75 -0.13 0.48 0.12 0.20 0.10 0.80 -0.04 0.75 0.90 -0.29 0.71 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.62 0.00 0.57 0.79 -0.18 0.51 0.11 0.19 0.12 0.87 -0.04 0.81 1.00
INT4ijt-1 0.18 0.18 -0.22 -0.41 0.18 -0.12 -0.25 0.35 0.03 0.29 0.22 -0.34 -0.65 0.67 -0.12 -0.29 0.90 0.17 0.16 0.12 -0.23 -0.48 0.25 -0.09 -0.27 0.45 0.09 0.25 0.17 -0.36 -0.76 0.74 -0.09 -0.34 1.00
INT5ijt-1 0.25 0.34 -0.07 0.33 0.09 0.50 0.60 0.07 0.55 0.35 0.39 -0.12 0.41 0.35 0.72 0.73 0.25 0.91 0.23 0.30 -0.06 0.31 0.14 0.51 0.60 0.10 0.59 0.32 0.36 -0.13 0.37 0.40 0.77 0.76 0.28 1.00
Table A4: The impact of the Europe Agreements on bilateral FDI in Europe; LSDV - estimates; adjustment dynamics
β β
Explanatory variables SHAC
Newey-
West SHAC
Newey-
West
Unweighted exogenous variables
     EAijt: Dummy variable for Europe Agreements 0.5064 0.1277 0.1434 *** 0.4141 0.1281 0.1418 ***
     SGDPijt: log(GDPit+GDPjt) -8.1240 1.8866 2.1921 *** -10.5776 2.2425 2.6150 ***
     RGDPijt: (log GDPit - log GDPjt) -3.0775 0.8873 1.0452 *** -4.9002 0.9780 1.1399 ***
     DSKijt: (SKit - SKjt) -0.0603 0.0922 0.1014 -0.0989 0.0986 0.1086
     INT1ijt: DSKijt×RGDPijt×I(SKit≤SKjt) -0.0022 0.0016 0.0017 -0.0031 0.0016 0.0018 *
     INT2ijt: DSKijt×RGDPijt×I(SKit>SKjt) -0.0050 0.0021 0.0023 ** -0.0052 0.0023 0.0026 **
     INT3ijt: DSKijt×SGDPijt×I(SKit>SKjt) 0.0020 0.0034 0.0037 0.0033 0.0036 0.0039
     INT4ijt: DSKijt×SGDPijt×I(Skit≤SKjt) -0.0025 0.0033 0.0037 -0.0039 0.0035 0.0039
     INT5ijt: DSKijt
2×(log DISTij) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 *
Spatially weighted variables
     EAijt -0.6904 0.3808 0.4211 * -0.4909 0.2883 0.3250 *
     SGDPijt 7.0764 5.6445 6.2394 5.2922 5.3097 5.8902
     RGDPijt 9.8295 3.3153 3.6855 *** 9.9885 2.9392 3.2931 ***
     DSKijt -0.3985 0.5433 0.6212 -0.4076 0.4510 0.5208
     INT1ijt 0.0046 0.0124 0.0141 -0.0085 0.0101 0.0117
     INT2ijt -0.0192 0.0166 0.0189 -0.0169 0.0138 0.0158
     INT3ijt 0.0143 0.0208 0.0238 0.0152 0.0172 0.0199
     INT4ijt -0.0158 0.0203 0.0231 -0.0158 0.0168 0.0194
     INT5ijt 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Time lags
   Unweighted exogenous variables
     EAijt-1 0.4095 0.1149 0.1257 *** 0.5038 0.1140 0.1246 ***
     SGDPijt-1 9.6723 1.8404 2.1598 *** 12.1970 2.1634 2.5423 ***
     RGDPijt-1 4.7644 0.8701 1.0118 *** 5.9608 0.9486 1.0984 ***
     DSKijt-1 0.0556 0.0917 0.1012 0.0500 0.0975 0.1083
     INT1ijt-1 0.0015 0.0017 0.0018 0.0024 0.0017 0.0018
     INT2ijt-1 0.0041 0.0021 0.0022 * 0.0034 0.0022 0.0023 *
     INT3ijt-1 -0.0020 0.0033 0.0037 -0.0018 0.0035 0.0039
     INT4ijt-1 0.0022 0.0033 0.0037 0.0019 0.0035 0.0039
     INT5ijt-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
   Spatially weighted variables
     EAijt-1 0.5005 0.3486 0.3865 0.2364 0.2599 0.2914
     SGDPijt-1 -18.2981 5.4719 6.0444 *** -22.2343 4.8351 5.3768 ***
     RGDPijt-1 -1.2356 3.1315 3.5099 1.0845 2.7077 3.0072
     DSKijt-1 0.0743 0.5418 0.6006 -0.5325 0.4471 0.4943
     INT1ijt-1 0.0214 0.0126 0.0143 * 0.0114 0.0092 0.0105
     INT2ijt-1 -0.0021 0.0162 0.0181 -0.0174 0.0132 0.0149
     INT3ijt-1 -0.0007 0.0206 0.0229 0.0216 0.0169 0.0188
     INT4ijt-1 0.0059 0.0203 0.0225 -0.0177 0.0168 0.0185
     INT5ijt-1 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 *** -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 **
σ2 0.5159 0.5152
R2 0.9891 0.9891
p-values of χ2-tests p-values of χ2-tests
Fixed country-pair effects 0.000 0.000
Fixed time effects 0.000 0.000
Spatially weighted X 0.000 0.000
First order time-lagged variables 0.000 0.000
Long run effect:    EAijt 0.000 0.000
Long run effect:    spatially weighted EAijt 0.587 0.346
Long run effect:    unweighted and spat. weighted EAijt 0.000 0.000
Note: The estimation is based on 3373 observations. To calculate the SHAC-standard errors we use the Bartlett-window with cut-off 0.2
which implies that 75% of the observations get the non-zero weight by the Bartlett window. The Newey-West estimates of the standard
errors use one time-lag. *** significant at 1%;  ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
NORMALIZED BY LARGEST ROW 
SUM  ROW NORMALIZED
Model 3 Model 4
Std. Std.


